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Any statute or administrative otder authorizing or compelling in-
voluntary medical or surgical treatment has the possibility of being
scrutinized and countermanded by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Where the deed is done before the Supreme Court can forbid it,
there still may be suits against the perpetrators for damages, and the
Supreme Court can decide whether the statute relied on for justification
is one entitled to constitutional sanction. In deciding such issues the
Supreme Court has no other primary guide than the provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution that "No State shall
... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." As a guide to judgment, this is no guide at all. Never-
theless the Supreme Court has for years, in the name of these provisions,
condemned legislation that a majority of its members deemed to be suffi-
ciently arbitrary and unreasonable. The exercise of this power has. not
been confined to the procedures by which governmental action is taken,
but has extended to the substance of the commands and prohibitions.
Few, if any, are likely to contend that this power has invariably been
wisely exercised. On several issues the average of the Supreme Court
is zero. The Court has held that an employer may not be forbidden to
exact as a condition of employment that the employee will not become
or remain a member of a labor union. The Court has held the contrary.
It has similarly reversed itself on the issue of a ten-hour limitation of
labor in factories and on the issue of legislative prescription of a min-
imum wage for women in industry. In thus referring to "the Court" as
though it were a continuing body, a caution would be necessary if it
were not so obvious. While, through the somersault of Mr. Justice
Roberts, the same bench both condemned and sustained a minimum wage
law, usually any decided shift in decision comes after a shift in the
composition of the tribunal. This could not be denied as a matter of
fact, Yet what to a plain man would seem a necessary inference from
the fact, is not so universally acknowledged.
The law books have been full of foolish statements from judges
which would make them out to be mere automatons in applying meaning-
* Pursuant to the plan of the Medico-Legal Symposium this article will also
appear in 18 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE (April 1943) -.
t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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less constitutional phrases to determine the validity of statutes. From
dissenting judges, however, often comes the charge that the majority
have unjustifiably transformed their own views of public policy into
t:onstitutional commands or prohibitions. Most amusingly a distinguished
lawyer and former. judge in protesting against the President's so-called
"court packing plan" asserted the theory of judicial automatism, ap-
parently unaware that if it made no difference who "was on the bench,
it made no difference who was on the bench. We know well enough
from recent history that it does make a difference. We have seen too
many new judicial attitudes substituted for former ones. Not a few of
them have been direct and confessed recantations. Others have been de-
cisions which clearly would not have been reached by an earlier bench
but which found no direct precedents in their way. Still others have
been decisions accompanied by opinions which made such sleazy distinc-
tions between the case at bar and its predecessors that it was apparent
to persons with a modicum of discernment that the current had changed
its course.
From this propensity of judges to pretend that they are consistent
with the past when it is obvious that they are not, arises a major difficulty
in prophesying what they will do next. The old precedents hang on, not
overruled. A later court may follow them and rely on the unjustifiable
distinction drawn in the interim. Or the unjustifiable distinction may be
repeated a number of times and later be officially recognized as a con-
tradiction rather than a distinction and hence an inflicter of a mortal
wound on the law that lived before. Such are the perils to prophecy
when it is pretty obvious that the judicial distinctions are skating on
very thin ice. When it is not obvious, the lot of the would-be prophet is
certainly no happier. There are too many cases where clearly tenable
distinctions have been made the sensible basis of judgment and yet have
later turned out to be forerunners of an erosion or an abandonment of
what had -been well established earlier. An expert can report what a
court has said and done and can weave it all into an apparently neat and
harmonious pattern. It still remains true that it is often a gamble to try
to forecast what the court will say and do next.
Akin to the difficulties of prophecy when there are a number of
decisions and opinions to be taken into consideration is the difficulty of
knowing how wide is the scope of a single decision. By approved canons
a court wisely confines itself to the decision required by the facts; and
technically the decision, as distinguished from dictum, does not extend
beyond the issue or issues which must be settled to dispose of the dispute.
Yet often the reasons given in the court's supporting opinion warrant the
belief that the principle on which the decision rests is broad enough to
embrace a much wider range of facts. Nevertheless, later the decision
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may be narrowly limited to the minimum grounds sufficient to support it.
On the other hand, a court in deciding a case may lay stress on each
individual element so as to leave itself unfettered by precedent when
presented with a new problem containing any variant in the facts. Sel-
dom are two cases exactly on all fours. When they are, there is not likely
to be litigation unless a contender fights chiefly for delay or is ready to
bet that a court will change its mind. Almost always there is the ques-
tion whether the differences in the facts are enough to make a difference
in result. Hence, the law remains a congeries of particulars but imper-
fectly subsumed under general principles.
I
One aspect of this perennial problem of uncertainty appears in Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts1 which in 1905 by a vote of seven to two sustained
a compulsory vaccination law. The particular statute vested power in
Boards of Health to require vaccination when in their opinion it was
necessary to the public health. There was an exception in favor of chil-
dren vho present a certificate, signed by a registered physician, that
they are unfit subjects for vaccination. There was no such exception in
favor of adults. The adult convicted of violating the statute by refusing
to comply with an order did not allege that he was in fact an unfit sub-
ject for vaccination. He did not present or ask leave to present any
physician's certificate. Smallpox was prevalent to some extent in the
city at the time of the Board's order. The defendant sought to introduce
evidence tending to show the ineffectiveness and the dangers of innocula-
tion. The evidence was excluded by the trial court. On this state of
facts, the conviction was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The compulsory requirement was held under the circumstances
to be within the police power of the state for the protection of health.
We must go to the opinion of the Court to attempt to ascertain how
far the decision goes. The refusal to hear the evidence offered by the
defendant was justified on the ground that it went only to a dispute be-
tween two theories. The Court knew judicially (i.e., without having to
take formal evidence) that the theory favoring vaccination accords with
common belief. It said that it must assume that the state was not un-
aware of the opposing theories and that it was compelled of necessity to
choose between them. This, it had power to do. "It was not compelled
to commit a matter involving the public health and safety to the final
decision of a court or jury."'2 This declaration, isolated from the rest
of the opinion, would seem to go far to sanction all sorts of compulsory
inoculation for all sorts of menaces however disputable and disputed
1 197 U. S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 358, 49 L. ed. 643 (1905).
2Id. at 30, 25 S. Ct. 363, 49 L. ed. 651.
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their value. But the Court had pointed out that vaccination was favored
by "common belief." s It cited legislation in England beginning in 1808
which encouraged or compelled vaccination. The Court knew what
every other sensible person knew, and this knowledge lay in the back-
ground of its decision and opinion and must be recognized in qualifica-
tion of occasional statements of broad general tenor.
Thus, as the decision does not go beyond vaccination against small-
pox, so it does not surely go beyond compulsion when the malady is
prevalent. For after invoking recitals of such prevalence in the order
of the Board of Health, the opinion continued:
"If such was the situation,-and nothing is asserted or appears in the
record to the contrary,--if we are to attach any value whatever to the
knowledge which, it is safe to affirm, is common to all civilized peoples
touching smallpox and the methods most usually employed to eradicate
that disease, it cannot be adjudged that the present regulation of the
board of health was not necessary in order to protect the public health
and secure the public safety. Smallpox being prevalent and increasing
at Cambridge, the court would usurp the functions of another branch of
government if it adjudged, as matter of law, that the mode adopted
under the sanction of the state to protect the people at large was arbi-
trary, and not justified by the necessities of the case. -We say necessities
of the case, because it might be that an acknowledged power of a local
community to protect itself against an epidemic threatening the safety
of all might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference
to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or
might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of
the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the
protection of such persons."
4
Here is warning enough that the Court is going only so far as the
particular circumstances require. A more specific caveat appears in the
treatment of the apparent absoluteness of the statute in dealing with
adults. While it was held to be a reasonable classification for the statute
not to embrace adults in an exception.in favor of children presenting a
physician's certificate of unfitness for vaccination, this holding was
substantially nullified by saying that there might be extreme cases in
which the Court would interfere by in effect importing into the statute
a dispensation for abnormal adults. After saying that general language
should be interpreted to exclude injustice, oppression, or an absurd con-
sequence, the opinion continues:
"Until otherwise informed by the highest court of Massachusetts, we
are not inclined to hold that the statute establishes the absolute rule that
an adult must be vaccinated if it be apparent or can be shown with rea-
sonable certainty that he is not at the time a fit subject of vaccination,
8 Ibid.




or that vaccination, by reason of his then condition, would seriously im-
pair his health, or probably cause his death. No such case is here
presented."5
This does not say that an adult who failed to make any appearance to
claim a dispensation could escape from punishment by later evidence be-
fore a court. It does not say with certainty that failure to excuse an adult
with a certificate would render compulsory vaccination unconstitutional.
It seeks to avoid the issue by suggesting to the state court that it should
read an exception into the statuteO* Such a hint would in all likelihood
Id. at 39, 25 S. Ct. 366-367, 49 L. ed. 655.
e* [The North Carolina compulsory vaccination statute of 1893 vests discretion
in the local Board of Health to impose the vaccination requirement. N. C. Public
Laws 1893, c. 214, N. C. CODE AN. (Michie, 1939) §§7162-7164. Also, the gov-
erning body of any North Carolina city may cause all persons within the city limits
to be vaccinated in order to prevent or stamp out contagion. N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1939) §2796; Levin v. Town of Burlington, 129 N. C. 184, 39 S. E. 822
(1901). The compulsory vaccination law has been held constitutional even though
it makes no exception in favor of persons whose health is in such a condition that
it would be dangerous to require them to be vaccinated. State v. Hays, 126 N. C.
999, 35 S. E. 459 (1900). Though the statute itself makes no such exception the
North Carolina court has, in effect, wisely read it in as an additional term, placing
the burden of proving that vaccination would be unsafe in an individual case upon
the person seeking to escape such vaccination. State v. Hay, 126 N. C. 999, 1003-
1004, 35 S. E. 459, 461 (1900) ; and see the concurring opinion of Douglas, J. in
State v. Hay, 126 N.'C. 999, 1004-1006, 35 S. E. 459, 462 (1900) ; approved, Morgan
v. Stewart, 144 N. C. 424, 428, 57 S. E. 149, 150 (1907). However, where a School
Board required vaccination as a prerequisite to attendance at the public schools it
was held that there need be no exception made.so as to allow attendance by an indi-
vidual whose health would not permit vaccination. The court pointed out the
obvious distinction: "The fact that it would be dangerous to vaccinate the plaintiffs
daughter, owing to her physical condition, would be a defense for her to 'an order
for general compulsory vaccination (State v. Hay, supra), but is no reason why
she should be excepted from a resolution excluding from the school all children
who have not been vaccinated. That she cann6t safely be vaccinated may make it
preferable that she herself should run the risk of taking the small-pox, but is no
reason that the children of the public school should be exposed to like risk of infec-
tion, through her, or others in like case. Though the school children are vaccinated,
there are always some whose vaccination is imperfect, and danger to them should
not be increased by admitting those not vaccinated at all. Besides, a rule not en-
forced to all alike will soon cease to be a rule enforcible at all." Hutchins v. School
Committee of Durham 137 N. C. 68, 71-72, 49 S. E. 46, 47 (1904).
In 1939 North Carolina became the first state to subject diphtheria to compulsory
public control. N. C. Public Laws 1939, c. 126, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)
§7169(1), A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1939 (1939) 17
N. C. L. Rav. 360. The compulsory diphtheria immunization statute applies only to
children under five and, like the smallpox vaccination statute, makes no exception
in favor of individuals whose state of health might make it dangerous to immunize
them with the diphtheria agent. But, in the light of the smallpox vaccination
cases, it is safe to assume that the court will require such an exception to be made
if medical science can show it to be warranted. Unlike the smallpox statute, the
diphtheria law lays down a flat requirement of immunizatioh and does not place
the compulsion in the discretion of a Board of Health. Also, the diphtheria law
contains a provision that the statute shall not apply to children whose parents "are
bona fide members of a religious organization whose teachings are contrary to the
practices herein required." No such concession to religious dogma is found in the
smallpox statute. In the interest of public health it is possible that this provision
in favor of religious objectors could be circumvented under the doctrine of the
Hutchins case, supra. School Boards could exclude from the public schools all
children who had not been previously immunized against diphtheria and make no
19431
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be taken by state courts. Such exceptions should be accorded by any
sensible Board of Health without advice from any legislature or court,
if there were reasonable grounds for confidence in the certifying physi-
cian. Doubtless in some fashion the dispensations have been granted if
requests have been made, for the Supreme Court has had no subsequent
controversy presenting the issue for formal adjudication. Its caution in
favor of individualization must have been heeded widely. Constitutional
law is permeated with similar cautions against extreme and unusual
applications of statutes found not objectionable in general. The cautions
have not infrequently been translated into condemnations. Particularity
is of the essence of constitutional law, as it is a major theme of this
effort at diagnosis.
While the Court saved itself from sanctioning compulsory vaccination
except when smallpox is in the vicinage, it must be doubted whether
this condition would be insisted upon. Some state courts in construing
broad powers vested in School Boards and Boards of Health to take
action to protect the public health have drawn the distinction between
seasons of epidemic and the absence thereof. The cases are not recent
ones, and they are not to be commended for good sense. A stitch in time
saves nine, and the time to lock the barn is before the horse is stolen.
At any rate where legislative authority to compel vaccination is ex-
plicitly conferred, it is unthinkable that at this late date a court would
say that the vague due process clause forbids precaution and requires
procrastination until the presence of pestilence. Common sense forbids
us to believe that judicial sanction of compulsion in time of epidemic
carries with it a negative pregnant that compulsion is unconstitutional
otherwise.
One other observation in the opinion deserves mention. After re-
ferring to the liberty of a person to live and work where he will, it is
added that "yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his
will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests,
or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the
ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down
in its defense.' 7 This was not pertinent to the case at bar except for
pointing out that personal liberty is not absolute. Mr. Jacobson advanced
no objections on conscientious or religious grounds. Yet one wonders
whether the Court did not mention religion in order to forestall any
claims of conscience against health laws. Some queer sects do raise
such exception as is allowed by the statute. A Survey of Statutory Changes it
North Carolina in 1939 (1939) 17 N. C. L. Rav. 360, 361, n. 8. The diphtheria law
has not yet been the subject of judicial comment but there is little doubt that it
will be held constitutional.-Editor.]




such objections. Other more numerous religionists object to some other
compulsions affecting bodily integrity. Such objections have sometimes
prevailed with legislatures. They may have influenced some state courts
even though they have not been the explicit basis of decision. Thus far,
however, it cannot be said that they have carried weight with the United
States Supreme Court. This brings us to another topic.
II
In 1927 in Buck v. Bells the Supreme Court by a vote of eight to
one sustained a sterilization statute. In 1942 in Skinner v. Oklahoma9
it unanimously condemned another one. Our problem is to try to guess
whether the later decision indicates a total or partial recantation of the
earlier one or whether it indicates merely that a state must provide ade-
quate safeguards and move within a restricted area when it commands
the extinction of procreative power. On the facts there is the clearest
distinction between the two cases. The Virginia statute sustained in
Buck v. Bell applied only to mental defectives confined in institutions
and it provided elaborate procedure for notice, hearing and appeals.
Miss Buck was a feeble-minded daughter of a feeble-minded mother and
a feeble-minded mother of a feeble-minded daughter. Mr. Justice Holmes
declared that "The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is
broad enough to cover cutting the,Fallopian tubes"10 and that "Three
generations of imbeciles are enough."' 1 Mr. Justice Butler dissented,
but since he gave no opinion we do not know whether he would think
that we needed six or a dozen such generations instead of a meager
three.
In Buck v. Bell there was no attack on the procedure required by the
statute and scrupulously followed in the particular case. There was
criticism that equal protection was denied because the statute applied
only to those confined in institutions and not to the multitudes outside.
This was easily met by the general rule of reasonable classification and
by the more special retort that "Of course so far as the operations enable
those who otherwise must be kept confined to be returned to the world,
and thus open the asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more
nearly reached."'12 On the substantive issue, the brief on behalf of Miss
Buck did not adduce any religious grounds. It asserted that the operation
is unrelated to health or morals, and that the right to bodily integrity is
an absolute one. In rejecting the contention Mr. Justice Holmes went
8274 U. S. 200, 47 S. Ct. 584, 71 L. ed. 1000 (1927).
316 U. S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 86 L. ed. 1655 (1942).
"0Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200, 207, 47 S. Ct. 584, 585, 71 L. ed. 1000, 1002
(1927).
I'- Ibid.
"2Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200, 208, 47 S. Ct. 584, 585, 71 L. ed. 1000, 1002
(1927).
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further than was his usual custom and indicated affirmative approval
of the state's policy when he said:
"We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser
sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to pre-
vent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the
world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or
to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind."' 3
Turning now to the condemnation visited on the other statute in
Skinner v. Oklahoma, the main concern should be that of the psychologist
or the psychiatrist rather than any expert in black letter law. The inter-
esting thing about the decision is that seven members of the Court re-
frained from passing any judgment on the underlying issue of permanent
significance. They condemned the statute solely for discrimination and
in the particular case because it applied to triple offenders who commit
larceny but not to those who commit embezzlement. This, they held to
be a denial of equal protection of the laws. The defect could readily be
remedied by an amendment embracing embezzlers. Then one or two
more fundamental issues would have to be faced. One of them was
faced by Mr. Chief Justice Stone when he concurred on the sole ground
that the statute afforded to the prospective victim no opportunity to show
that his criminal tendencies are not of an inheritable type.14* With this,
Mr. Justice Jackson agreed. He also agreed that the discrimination
against thieves as contrasted With embezzlers offends against the require-
ment of equal protection of the laws. He disagreed with each of the
other two opinions "in so far as it rejects or minimizes the grounds
taken by the other."'15
There must'have been some reason why eight members of the Court
thought it important to lay stress on the discrimination point and why
23 ld. at 207, 47 S. Ct. 585, 71 L. ed. 1002.
14* [The North Carolina sterilization statute, which applies to mental incom-
petents outside of institutions as well as to those within, was held unconstitutional
by the North Carolina Supreme Court because it failed to provide for notice and
hearing and thus deprived the person to be sterilized of due process of law.
Brewer v. Valk, 204 N. C. 186, 167 S. E. 638 (1933). Immediately thereafter the
statute was revised to remedy these defects and provide in great detail a procedure
for notice, hearing, and appeal. The revision ^was so complete that, in effect, a new
statute was enacted. Some of the procedure has since been streamlined. Though
the statute in its new form, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§2304(m)-2304(ff2)
has never been passed on by the courts, it would almost certainly be considered
constitutional. For a complete discussion of the statute and its evolution see A Sur-
vey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1929 (1929) 7 N. C. L. IZEv. 392;
A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1933 (1933) 11 N. C. L. REV.
253; A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1935 (1935) 13 N. C. L.
Rav. 401.-Editor.]




seven wished to do nothing more. In general the fact that a statute
doesn't go so far as it reasonably might has not in recent years been a
basis for condemnation. Mr. Justice Douglas in the opinion of the Court
gives general recognition of this in quoting with approval from Buck V.
Bell the statement that "the law does all that is needed when it does all
that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks
to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its
means allow."'- 6 He, however, then goes on to point out that this par-
ticular legislation "involves one of the basic civil rights of man'17 and
elaborates on the possibility of its application as a weapon of discrimina-
tion against a particular race or nationality.'L*
The cases cited for these views are ones involving members of the
Chinese and colored races. Such invocation suggests that the judges
were less concerned with the triviality of the distinctions between larceny
and embezzlement than with the desirability of setting up a barrier
against legislative race discrimination. While they emphasize the severe
and irrevocable deprivation from sterilization, they say that they do so
not to re-examine the scope of the police power of the state. Clearly
what they most fear is that sterilization may be employed as a weapon
of class hostility. It would seem that they would not trust the safeguard
of a hearing on the individual's potentiality of communicating criminal
traits, for they refrain from joining with the Chief Justice on this point.
Even with the safeguard of a hearing, there could be discrimination in
administration merely by refraining from proceeding against those of
a preferred class. The case does not reveal to what race the petitioner
belonged. The first of his three convictions was for stealing chickens.
16 Id. at 540, 62 S. Ct. 113, 86 L. ed. 1660, quoted from Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S.
200, 208, 47 S. Ct. 584, 585, 71 L. ed. 1000, 1002 (1927).
17 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L. ed. 1655,
1660 (1942).*8 "Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and sur-
vival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-
reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or
types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear. There is
no redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment which the
State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic
liberty. We mention these matters not to reExamine the scope of the police power
of the States. We advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that strict
scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential,
lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against groups or
types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal
laws. The guaranty of 'equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of
equal laws.' Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369. When the law lays an
unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense
and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if
it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment. Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, supra; Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U. S. 535, 541, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L. ed. 1655, 1660, (1942).
1943]
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The case came from Oklahoma. Oklahoma has been rebuked by the
Supreme Court in other matters in which racial issues were involved. 19
In certain sections of the country the possibility of a considerable
degree of racial discrimination would be present in a statute dealing with
all habitual criminals as determined by three convictions for felony. One
can hardly say that there was no warrant for this judicial emphasis on
discrimination, though one must wonder somewhat why there was un-
willingness to join in the objection to lack of a hearing on the issue of
transmissibility in the individual case. Even if the Chief Justice's sole
reliance on the absence of a hearing might on its face suggest a possible
negative pregnant that there was no other substantive defect, Mr. Justice
Douglas protected himself and his seven colleagues from any complicity
in such an inference by saying explicitly of all objections other than
that of discrimination that "we pass those points without intimating an
opinion on them."20 Nor does he anywhere seem to intimate any opinion
except as to the fundamental nature of the civil right involved and the
danger of its invasion as a weapon of discrimination. It is unthinkable
that he and those for whom he wrote would not insist upon a hearing
even in a non-discriminatory law. Hence in the absence of any knowl-
edge of what went on in conference, one can only venture the notion
that they thought or felt that it would emphasize the menace of class
discrimination if it were made the exclusive basis of condemnation.
The Chief Justice, though technically he confines himself to the
absence of a hearing, intimates a doubt whether criminality is physically
transmissible. In objecting to basing the decision on discrimination he
says:
"Moreover, if we must presume that the legislature knows-what
science has been unable to ascertain-that the criminal tendencies of any
class of habitual offenders are transmissible regardless of the varying
mental characteristics of its individuals, I should suppose that we must
likewise presume that the legislature, in its wisdom, knows that the
criminal tendencies of some classes of offenders are more likely to be
transmitted than those of others."
2 1
And later, in a passage which seems to reaffirm Buck v. Bell and to point
a difference between the statute there and the one before the court, he
adds:
"Science has found and the law has recognized that there are certain
types of mental deficiency associated with delinquency which are in-
heritable. But the State does not contend-nor can there be any pre-
tense-that either common knowledge or experience, or scieritific investi-
" See Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 35 S. Ct. 926, 59 L. ed. 1340
(1915) ; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 59 S. Ct. 872, 83 L. ed. 1281 (1939)."0 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 538, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 1112, 86 L. ed. 1655,
1658'(1942).
2
21d. at 544, 62 S. Ct. 1114, 86 L. ed. 1661.
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gation, has given assurance that the criminal tendencies of any class of
habitual offenders are universally or even generally inheritable.1 22
These two passages make it extremely likely that the Chief Justice would
scrutinize severely any finding by physicians that any individual would
be likely to breed criminals merely because he had been thrice convicted
himself. It would seem that at most he would be satisfied only by other
findings of physical and mental degeneracy comparable to those made
in the case of Miss Buck.
Mr. Justice Jackson in his special concurrence clearly intimates that
he thinks a fundamental constitutional issue would remain even if the
defects of discrimination and absence of hearing were cured. He does
not even go so far as to give clear approval to Buck v. Bell when he
merely recites the fact that "This Court has sustained ' 23 the compulsion
under the particular circumstances there existing. This is quite different
from the Chief Justice's statement that "Undoubtedly a state may"24
compel whAt was sanctioned in Buck v. Bell. Quite frequently during
the current judicial dispensation, mere recitals of former rulings and of
the grounds which predecessors adduced for them have been indications
of a disposition to qualify or reject rather than to reaffirm. While to
Mr. Justice Holmes his reference to three generations of imbeciles may
have been merely a superfluous rhetorical rivet, its repetition by Mr.
Justice Jackson may possibly be designed to turn it into a more or less
essential condition. Should any such requirement be judicially imposed,
the state would find it more practical to deal with habitual offenders by
stone walls and iron bars rather than by the surgeori's knife.
III
So much for what justices of the United States Supreme Court have
said and done. The recital does not throw much light on what they or
their successors would do with milder eugenic measures, except to make
clear that they would be zealous in insisting upon strong scientific sup-
port for the necessity and the efficacy of prophylactic prescriptions and
upon adequate procedural safeguards in picking the persons subjected
to them. A materialist might find it somewhat sentimental to emphasize
the sacredness of procreative power when for habitual ofenders there
may be deprivation of all opportunity for its, exercise. There are, how-
ever, other than materialistic elements in the problem, ones that in cer-
tain tightly knit fellowships would obtain even if the state did no more
than to proffer sterility as the price of release from long prospective
2 Id. at 545, 62 S. Ct. 1115, 86 L. ed. 1662.
"Id, at 546, 62 S. Ct. 1116, 86 L. ed. 1663.
21 Id. at 544, 62 S. Ct. 1115, 86 L. ed. 1662.
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incarceration. From a practical standpoint such release would mean the
relinquishment of the most adequate safeguard against continued criminal
enterprise by an already practiced and proficient offender.
If all this seems sadly vague and amorphous to those who extract
certainties out of test tubes, it can only be answered that of such is the
kingdom of jurisprudence. Even in the kingdom of the healing art one
does not always find complete concord and certainty. One who listens
to the nauseating promulgation of nostrums on the radio must turn in
increased confidence to the more modest and tentative approach of the
physician. The sin of the law is not that it is empirical and particularistic
but that so often it professes to derive from the universal and the abso-
lute. This is especially foolish when courts exercise power over legisla-
tures in the name of unenlightening constitutional cautions. Happily the
practice not only does not accord with the profession, btft is far superior.
Strange as it may seem that we have a system of government under
which five lawyers on a bench in Washington can say "No" when a state
legislature and a state court have said "Yes" and base their negative
on their views of social policy, it would be hard to maintain that there
was not wisdom in making a distinction between the case of Mr. Skinner
and that of Miss Buck.
There is nothing in the law books which would give a lawyer any
special competence to pass judgment on what the Supreme Court would
say about other eugenic measures less drastic than sterilization and more
far reaching and invasive than vaccination. The immediacy of danger
from contagious and infectious diseases, the substantial certainty of a fair
degree of efficacy from recognized curative and preventative measures,
the avoidance of finality in their application-these and other considera-
tions should keep the decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma from being a
stumbling block in the way of any sane public health program however
much it may intrude on privacy and preclude self-determination. There
are, of course, sects which don't believe in medicine at all and other sects
which object to the intrusion of animal substances, but the time has not
yet come when their tenets are likely to carry even subconscious weight
with the Supreme Court as claimants for inclusion in the protection sur-
rounding civil or religious liberty. Whether they may in some areas
have weight with state legislatures and state courts is somewhat less
certain. Voters may carry weight by their numbers quite as much as by
their reason.
One final point may deserve mention. If the Supreme Court is satis-
fied that a measure belongs in the field of public health and is not
patently or covertly punitive in design, the intervention of a jury is not
necessary in the determination of the facts in the individual case. This
is established by Buck v. Bell and by Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Pro-
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bate Court,25 subject always to the qualification that precedents continue
to be followed. The Pearson case involved the commitment of a so-called
"psychopathic personality" to an institution. Except for the non-inter-
vention of a jury, the proceedings before the Probate Court and on ap-
peal were scrupulously protective against the danger of error. As to the
compulsory appointment of two physicians to assist in the examination, the
Court said that "The argument that these doctors may not be sufficiently
expert in this type, of cases merely invites conjecture. There is no reason
to doubt that qualified medical men are usually available." 28 Such faith
should be welcome to the medical profession. It would be an extreme
legalist who could say as much for the general run of jurors. Some, of
course, may question the infallibility of judges, but under our system
they have the final say if duly invited to say it.
'309 U. S. 270, 60 S. Ct. 523, 84 L. ed. 744 (1940).
"Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U. S. 270, 276, 60 S. Ct. 523,
526, 84 L. ed. 744, 750 (1940).
